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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Appellant Hector Paez (hereinafter Mr. Paez and/or Appellant) appeals
following a conditional plea of guilty to the crime of felony DUI and persistent
violator.
Appellant asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress because the anonymous informant tip from a citizen was insufficient to
provide reasonable suspicion for his seizure by police.

Statement of the Facts
The official versions of the facts as they appear in the PSI are as follows:
According to the appended police reports, on March 24, 2012 at
approximately 9:15 pm, Officers Christensen and Coltrin were on
foot patrol for the Treefort Music Festival in downtown Boise, and
were approached by MAV Security Supervisor and a private citizen.
The citizen advised that he had just had contact with a person who
was "very intoxicated" and trying to drive away from the area in a
beige colored Ford Taurus. As the citizen described the individual,
the Security Supervisor said that the description of the man
sounded like the Hispanic male that she had just ejected from the
music festival.
Officers Christensen and Coltrin immediately responded to the
location where the citizen said the intoxicated individual was
located, and located the Ford Taurus parked on Main St. They
observed that the vehicle was running and the brake lights were
activated, and could see a Hispanic male in the driver's seat, who
was attempting to get the vehicle into gear.
Officer Christensen approached the vehicle and tapped on the
driver's side window, and seconds later, opened the driver's side
door. He immediately detected a very strong odor of an alcoholic
beverage coming from inside the vehicle, and the driver, who later
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Officer Christensen observed that Mr. Paez had slow, slurred
speech and bloodshot eyes, and Mr. Paez later admitted to
consuming two (2) to three (3) beers at the music festival.
STEP Officer Hoffman arrived on the scene and asked Mr. Paez to
exit the vehicle, which he appeared to have a very difficult time
doing. Mr. Paez had an unsteady gait and his knees would "unlock"
while standing, which caused him to quickly dip towards the ground
before catching his balance. Officer Hoffman attempted to
administer standardized field sobriety tests, and as he was
explaining the Walk and Turn Test, Mr. Paez's demeanor changed
and he refused to cooperate with the remaining tests. Officer
Hoffman placed Mr. Paez under arrest for suspicion of driving
under the influence of alcohol, and transported him to the Ada
County Jail for a blood draw.
At the Ada County Jail, Mr. Paez became very belligerent and
argumentative, and advised that he would not comply with the
blood draw process. Officer Mitchell was able to talk him into
cooperating, and two (2) samples were collected, resulting in a
blood alcohol level of .324.
PSI, p. 3.
Course of Proceedings
Mr. Paez was charged by criminal complaint (and later information) with
felony operating a motor vehicle while under the influence 'of alcohol (one felony
conviction within 15 years) and misdemeanor driving without privileges. (R. p. 5,
27.) An information part II was filed charging him with persistent violator. (R. p.

39-41.)
Mr. Paez filed a motion to suppress his seizure and all evidence obtained
thereafter, which was denied after a hearing. (R. p. 46-53, 63.) He then entered
a conditional guilty plea in which he pied guilty to the felony DUI and persistent
violator and expressly reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to
suppress. (R. p. 66, 67-73.)

4

The court sentenced Mr. Paez to 15 years with the first 3 years fixed. (R.

p. 76.)
Mr. Paez timely appeals. (R. p. 82.)
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ISSUE

WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION TO
SUPPRESS BECAUSE THE POLICE OFFICER LACKED REASONABLE
SUSPICION TO SEIZE MR. PAEZ
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ARGUMENT

THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS
BECAUSE THE POLICE OFFICER LACKED REASONABLE SUSPICION
TO SEIZE MR. PAEZ
A.

Standard of review
As to the standard of review for this issue, State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804

(2009), explained as follows:
When reviewing a trial court's denial of a defendant's motion to
suppress, this Court gives deference to the trial court's findings of
fact, which will be upheld so long as they are not clearly erroneous.
Findings of fact are not clearly erroneous if they are supported by
substantial and competent evidence. Decisions regarding the
credibility of witnesses, weight to be given to conflicting evidence,
and factual inferences to be drawn are also within the discretion of
the trial court. This Court exercises free review, however, over the
trial court's conclusions regarding "whether constitutional
requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found."
Accordingly, this Court freely reviews the constitutionality of a
search and seizure.
Id. at p. 810 (internal citations omitted).

B.

The evidence and court's ruling
At the end of the hearing on the motion to suppress, the court made the

following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
The events occurred on March 26, 2012, in Boise, Ada County,
Idaho.
The reporting officer, Sergeant Christensen, was attending a
festival, where there was a beer garden. Beer was sold.
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He was approached by Mr. Lynn McConkie, a security officer well
known to Sergeant Christensen, and another unidentified person,
and he was told - it's not clear who told him, but it sounds like it
was the unidentified person - that a Hispanic male was highly
intoxicated, that he was attempting to drive away in a beige Ford
Taurus, and Mr. McConkie indicated that it sounded like the
Hispanic person who had just been kicked out of the beer garden
area because he was intoxicated and causing problems.
The officer started over to the area that was described as the
location of the Ford Taurus, could see that the brake lights were on,
that the engine was running, and he decided that he better get
there in a hurry.
So he ran over, could observe that the driver of the vehicle, in fact,
was Hispanic, and had a -- looked, as I recall was sleepy and was
having difficulty in carrying out the simple act of putting the car into
gear. Also, observed that the motor of the vehicle was running at
that time.
Seems to me at this point under Terry versus Ohio the officer had
more than a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, specifically
that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol, and that the officers' actions thereafter were
fully justified and came within the exception to warrant requirement.
There is nothing - and just as an aside, I know it's not a very
important issue at this point, but clearly the reporting individual was
not a paid informant, but a citizen informant, even though his
identity is at this point unknown. So considering all of those facts, I
think - I conclude that this was a valid Terry stop, and the motion
to suppress is denied.
That'. s my findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order.
Tr. p. 41, In. 8--p. 43, In. 2.

C.

The court erred in denying the motion to suppress
The relevant legal standards are well established and are set forth by a

somewhat similar case, to wit, State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804 (2009):
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The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects
"[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. This guarantee has been incorporated
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
apply to the states. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81
S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 86 Ohio Law Abs. 513 (1961).
Evidence obtained in violation of the amendment may not be used
as evidence against the victim of the illegal government action.
State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841,846,103 P.3d 454,459 (2004); see
also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485, 83 S. Ct. 407,
9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963). This rule, known as the exclusionary rule,
applies to evidence obtained directly from the illegal government
action and to evidence discovered through the exploitation of the
original illegality, or the fruit of the poisonous tree. Page, 140 Idaho
at 846, 103 P.3d at 459; Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-88. The test is
"'whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the
evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by
exploitation of [the original] illegality or instead by means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint."' Wong Sun, 371
U.S. at 488 (quoting MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 221
(1959)). Under this test, evidence that is sufficiently attenuated from
the illegal government action may be admitted at trial. Page, 140
Idaho at 846, 103 P.3d at 459; see also Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at
488. When a defendant moves to exclude evidence on the grounds
that it was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the
government carries the burden of proving that the search or seizure
in question was reasonable. State v. Anderson, 140 Idaho 484,
486, 95 P.3d 635, 637 (2004).
The Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement has been
held to apply to brief investigatory detentions. See Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 19, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). To
determine whether such seizures are reasonable, courts first ask
"whether the officer's action was justified at its inception." Id. at 1920. The level of justification required depends on the intrusiveness
of the seizure. Id. at 20-22. Next, they consider whether the action
"was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place." Id. at 19-20.
Typically, seizures must be based on probable cause to be
reasonable. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500, 103 S. Ct.
1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983). However, limited investigatory
detentions, based on less than probable cause, are permissible
when justified by an officer's reasonable articulable suspicion that a
person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime. Id. at 498.
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Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts
and the rational inferences that can be drawn from those facts. See
State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct.
App. 2003); Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. The quantity and quality of
information necessary to establish reasonable suspicion is less
than that necessary to establish probable cause. Alabama v. White,
496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301 (1990). Still,
reasonable suspicion requires more than a mere hunch or
"inchoate and unparticularized suspicion." Id. at 329 (quoting
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 104 L.
Ed. 2d 1 (1989)). Whether an officer possessed reasonable
suspicion is evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances
known to the officer at or before the time of the stop. Sheldon, 139
Idaho at 983, 88 P.3d at 1223; United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S.
411, 417-18, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981).
Id. 810-811 (footnote omitted).
Bishop, like our case, involved a tip from an informant.

In Bishop, the

Hagerman Police Chief received a call from the City Superintendent who advised
the chief that two carnival workers who were in working in town, approached him
and indicated that a man had tried to sell them methamphetamine and had asked
the City Superintendent to report the incident to police. The City Superintendent
relayed the workers' description of the man who was then located by the police
chief.

After a series of events not relevant here, the man was arrested and

brought to the carnival workers who identified him as the man who had tried to
sell them methamphetamine.
The Idaho Supreme Court describe the law as it relates to informant's tips.
An informant's tip regarding suspected criminal activity may give
rise to reasonable suspicion when it would "warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief that a stop was appropriate." White,
496 U.S. at 329 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 22) (internal quotation
and alteration marks omitted). Whether a tip amounts to reasonable
suspicion depends on the totality of the circumstances including the
substance, source, and reliability of the information provided. See
id. at 328-29 (noting that "an informant's 'veracity,' 'reliability,' and
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'basis of knowledge"' are highly relevant factors in determining
whether reasonable suspicion exists). In other words, a tip must]
possess adequate indicia of reliability in order to justify a Terry
stop. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 32 L.
Ed. 2d 612 (1972). The more reliable the tip, the less information
required to establish reasonable suspicion. White, 496 U.S. at 330.
Factors indicative of reliability include whether the informant reveals
his or her identity and the basis of his or her knowledge, whether
the location of the informant is known, whether the information was
based on first-hand observations of events as they were occurring,
whether the information the informant provided was subject to
immediate confirmation or corroboration by police, whether the
informant has previously provided reliable information, whether the
informant provides predictive information, and whether the
informant could be held criminally liable if the report were
discovered to be false. White, 496 U.S. at 331-32; Williams, 407
U.S. at 146-47; State v. Larson, 135 Idaho 99, 101-02, 15 P.3d
334, 336-37 (Ct. App. 2000). If a tip lacks adequate indicia of
reliability, police generally must engage in further investigation
before conducting a Terry stop. Williams, 407 U. S. at 147.
Whether a tip that merely provides a description of a suspect and
alleges that he or she committed a crime amounts to reasonable
suspicion depends on whether the tip was anonymous. See Florida
v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271-72, 120 S. Ct. 1375, 146 L. Ed. 2d 254
(2000); see also State v. Van Dome, 139 Idaho 961, 965, 88 P.3d
780, 784 (Ct. App. 2004). When such a tip is received from an
anonymous informant, the tip generally will not give rise to
reasonable suspicion. See J.L., 529 U.S. at 271-72 (concluding that
a tip that a young man was carrying a gun did not give rise to
reasonable suspicion because the anonymous informant merely
alleged that the man committed a crime and provided a description
of the suspect). On the other hand, when such a tip is received
from a known citizen-informant, the tip is generally sufficient to
establish reasonable suspicion. Van Dome, 139 Idaho at 965, 88
P.3d at 784 (concluding that a known citizen-informant's tip
indicating that the suspect was likely intoxicated and describing the
suspect's vehicle provided police with reasonable suspicion to
conduct a stop). Tips made by known citizen-informants are
presumed reliable because the informant's reputation can be
assessed and, if the informant is untruthful, he or she may be
subject to criminal liability for making a false report. Id. Accordingly,
independent police verification of such tips is generally not
necessary. Id.; see also Williams, 407 U.S. at 146-47. Still, under
the totality of the circumstances analysis, the content of the tip and
the informant's basis of knowledge remain relevant in determining
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whether the tip gave rise to reasonable suspicion. See State v.
Zapata-Reyes, 144 Idaho 703, 708, 169 P.3d 291, 296 (Ct. App.
2007).
An informant need not necessarily give the police his or her name
to be considered a known citizen-informant. Larson, 135 Idaho at
102, 15 P.3d at 337; see also United States v. Pasquaril/e, 20 F.3d
682, 687 (6th Cir. 1994) (concluding that an informant who called in
a report of drug dealing was not anonymous because he identified
himself as a person that was transporting prisoners and personally
observed the reported illegal activity). Typically, any information
that makes the informant's identity readily ascertainable will suffice.
Larson, 135 Idaho at 102, 15 P.3d at 337; see also United States v.
Reaves, 512 F.3d 123, 127 (4th Cir. 2008) (stating that police may
conclude tipster is credible when he or she "provides enough
information to allow the police to readily trace her identity"). This is
especially true when it is clear that the informant is not trying to
conceal his or her identity; for example, when the informant is
seeking police assistance or reporting illegal activity that he or she
personally observed. Larson, 135 Idaho at 102, 15 P.3d at 337.
Id. p. 811-812 (emphasis added).

In Bishop, the Appellant argued that the tip should be regarded as
anonymous since the City Superintendent's report was based on information
obtained from two unnamed carnival workers.
If Bishop's characterization of the tip as anonymous were correct,
the tip would not give rise to reasonable suspicion because it
merely alleged that Bishop had committed a crime and provided a
description of his present appearance and location. Miller would
have had to corroborate the tip or conduct an independent
investigation in order to legally stop Bishop. See White, 496 U.S. at
330-32.
Bishop's argument for characterizing the tip as anonymous is
unpersuasive. Superintendent Kelley, the individual who actually
reported Bishop's alleged attempt to sell methamphetamine, was a
known citizen-informant. There is no dispute that Chief Miller knew
Kelley's identity at the time Kelley phoned in the tip. Further, by
reporting the tip to Chief Miller, Kelley subjected himself to possible
criminal liability under Idaho Code section 18-705, which makes it a
crime to "knowingly give[] a false report to any peace officer."
Because Kelley was a known citizen-informant, his reliability is
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presumed.
The fact that Kelley's tip was based on a report from two unnamed
carnival workers does not transform his report into an anonymous
tip. Instead, the source of Kelley's information is only relevant in
assessing his basis of knowledge. Bishop points to no authority to
support the proposition that a citizen-informant's tip should be
reclassified as anonymous based solely on his or her basis of
knowledge. Moreover, Bishop's argument disregards the fact that
the carnival workers were not anonymous; instead, their identities
were readily ascertainable. Kelley provided police with sufficient
information to trace the workers' identities. This is evidenced by
the fact that Deputy Smith was able to locate the workers and have
them identify Bishop after he was arrested. And, while it is not clear
why the workers reported their allegations to Superintendent Kelley
rather than directly to the police, there is no evidence that the
workers were trying to conceal their identities. Because both Kelley
and the carnival workers were known citizen-informants, the tip is
presumptively reliable. Under the totality of the circumstances,
however, the content of the tip and the informants' basis of
knowledge are still relevant.
Id. p. 812-813.

Our case has some important differences which show that the tip was truly
anonymous and was not corroborated. First of all, the district court did remember
correctly that it was the citizen informant, and not the security officer known to
the police officer, who provided the information about the suspect. (Tr. p. 21, Ins.
22-25.) So out case is not like Bishop where the City Superintendant was known
to the police chief and so the report was not from an anonymous informant.
Further, since the security officer did not provide the information, unl_ike the City
Superintendent in Bishop, he had no potential liability for false report.
Next,

in our case unlike in Bishop, the citizen informant was not just

unnamed, but the police were unable to find him again. The police officer testified
at the suppression hearing that he did not know the citizen (and was not aware of
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any prior contacts with him) and when they went back later to try and find him
they were unable to locate him. (Tr. p. 22, In. 1-4.)
To summarize, an unnamed person came up to the police and provided a
description of a person and alleged he was committing a crime. As explained
above, this is an anonymous tip which does not give rise to reasonable
suspicion. To make matters worse, the police were later unable to locate that
person and so he did not later identify Mr. Paez as the subject of his allegations.
What's more, the fact that the person was accompanied by a security
guard known to the police changes nothing, because there was no evidence that
he knew the citizen either. The information was not relayed through the security
guard and so citizen's story was not in any way enhanced by the security guard's
pre-existing credibility with the police, and the security guard was not subject to
the consequences of a false report since he did not report a crime.
Further, the tip was not corroborated by the security guard. While he
claimed that the anonymous informant's description sounds like the description
of someone just ejected from the beer garden, the description was merely that
he was an intoxicated Hispanic male. The officer testified that there were several
hundred, if not a few thousand, people in the area for the event. (Tr. p. 14, In.
25-p. 15, In. 2.) Given, this, what is basically just a racial identification is too
general to have provided any meaningful corroboration. Further, the police officer
testified that the security guard did not go with him over to where Mr. Paez was
located, nor positively identified him at any time. (Tr. p. 28, In. 24-p. 29, In. 14.)
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Likewise, the observations of the police officer, that the driver of the car
looked sleepy and appeared to be having trouble putting the car in gear, were
just too general to corroborate the anonymous tip.

By the way, this was all

observed through the closed window of a car when it was dark out. (Tr. p. 16, In.
2; p. 19, In. 14.)

It is undisputable that Mr. Paez was seized when the officer opened his
car door. But since there was no reasonable suspicion to seize him, his Fourth
Amendment rights were violated, and so

the evidence following that seizure

must be suppressed and the court erred when it held otherwise.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Paez requests this Court reverse the order of the district court denying
his motion to suppress and remand this matter to the district court for withdrawal
of his guilty plea and further proceedings without the u . nstitutionally obtained
evidence.
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